2.4 The Manhattan Project

“THE INSTITUTION OF SPIES”

The security of a state depends on the loyalties of its elements of sovereignty: of the king, the minister, the treasury, the army, the fort, the country and the allies. There are numerous means of securing such loyalties, and there are numerous means for them to be secured or seized by the enemy. This game played between a king and his enemy is termed war.

A formal declaration does not mark the start of war, similarly a peace treaty does not mark its end, only that of open war. War is perpetual, in one form or the other, and a king cannot rest even after he has completed a conquest, for the continued possession of an article requires continued active participation in such war as it persists.

It is then asked: how can such mighty forces – a great army, great wealth, a great population and country, large numbers of secure fortresses, foreign kings, the intellect of ministers – be made loyal to the will of a king alone?

Bhāradvāja says the king must be like a lion in the forest: even though he is small in number, he is far too powerful to be defeated by animals that are more numerous.

Parāśara says he must be like a mahout controlling an elephant: even though he is weaker than the elephant, he is able to control it by virtue of his position and tools.

But these are not correct: a king need not be the mightiest of his country in either dimension of masculine strength: intellectual, physical or otherwise; indeed, such strengths may be suited to other economic pursuits than kingship. Nor may a country be compared to an elephant, as unlike an elephant it contains men with intellect and technology equal or superior to that of the king.

Thus, I say he must be like a sluice in a canal – or like any other machine.

“I believe that control over a large army requires a larger army,” says Pabbata, “And likewise for a treasury, a country, a fort, an ally, and an intellect. Is this not so?”

No, as such demands would be infinite – even if you secure frontier articles in this way, the capital would still remain unsecured, as the chaotic political history of Magadha attests. And although the Persians claim that they have achieved stability by seizing powerful articles away from the countries they conquer, this alone cannot guarantee stability, as the king still assigns these articles to his subordinates; furthermore such centralization is an obstacle to mobility; as a result, Persia is weak at fighting on multiple fronts.

Much as a small sluice controls a far more powerful current, much as a lever controls the heavy projectiles loaded onto a catapult, much as a switch controls the flow of activity to a mill from a load raised by a water-wheel; similarly large elements may be controlled by small ones placed strategically and with intrigue.

Such small elements are termed spies.

Spies are secret by default, and are not allowed to admit their role or source of income to even those close to them – why?

“Because wise counsel lies in not revealing what one has determined to carry out,” says Candragupta.

The goal of spies is to ensure loyalty among the elements of sovereignty. To this end, they carry out the following three types of operations:

• gathering intelligence on and influencing the opinions and plans of ministers, officials, army, forts, country and allies
• scouting and affecting the same of an ally, enemy or neutral state
• conducting covert operations against an enemy

A spy may allure various members to betray the king and test their loyalties in this way. Such allurement may be in the form of persuasion, bribery, threats or deceit.

• Allurement by bribery is the most crucial as it is such methods that are used by enemies most frequently: bribery includes bribery by wealth, titles and positions of power, sexual favours and other incentives.
• Allurement by persuasion is second most crucial: a spy may speak ill of the king in confidence to the subject, and if the latter agrees, he may be disposed from his position as he is seen as susceptible to being turned by persuasion.
• Allurement by threats is crucial to maintain discipline among officials and the army: those who successfully resist such threats and report them to the king risking their lives may be heralded for their courage without making it publicly known that the threat was an intelligence operation.
• Allurement by deceit may be done to prevent subjects from having their superstitions exploited by tricks and contravariances used by the enemy.

Thus the firmness, honesty, courage and intelligence of subjects may be tested by spies through the respective methods of gathering intelligence.

Spies may also conduct simpler listening and propaganda operations to the same end.

Likewise for spies scouting and affecting foreign countries and their articles.

Covert operations conducted by spies sabotage one or more of the enemy’s elements of sovereignty.

• Sabotage of the king and minister is assassination, kidnapping, seduction of the queen, disruption of councils and other offenses against the person.
• Sabotage of forts and armies is infiltration; these involve replacing army men and merchandise with inferior quality or traitorous substitutes, and of smuggling weapons into forts.
• Sabotage of the treasury is looting.
• Sabotage of the country is the destruction or seizure of farm and mine produce, poisoning of streams and livestock, and the obstruction of roads.
• Sabotage of the ally is obstructing or falsifying messages sent and received by the enemy.

The following applies to all kinds of spying operations: just as a chariot may be pulled by an excess of horses tied in such a way that the vehicle is still functional when one of them is slain, at least three spies should be issued independently towards one goal without being revealed to each other, and their reports should be checked to agree – this way, spies can be made to spy on one another, and their loyalties can be checked.

Similarly, the spies and the espionage institutions should not be known to each other. This is to prevent the formation of conspiracies against the government, and to prevent captured spies from revealing information that compromises other spies or operations of the government.

Similarly, spies should be trained to use special pre-defined symbols – if their tasks are sufficiently generic, they should be trained to communicate in cipher.

Spies must be recruited from all walks of life. Those in all four stages of life – students, householders, recluses and ascetics – may all be recruited. Of chief importance are merchants, prostitutes, cooks and such servants, respected heroes and colleagues of the subject being spied on.

Criminals are particularly useful as spies, especially when it is not known to themselves that they are being used as spies. Such spies may also be used in situations where it is necessary to make a show of executing the spy after the operation is conducted.

Finally, a king may keep a known traitor, corrupt official, criminal or incompetent in his government for several reasons, including: pooling of intelligence about other traitors from those who associate with the known traitor, centrally manipulating such other traitors through the known traitor, use as a scapegoat in public relations disasters, use as fodder in various operations.

[date:-480|flashback,x]

The king of Magadha laughed. Not a wicked sort of laugh that one may have expected from the caricatures of him in plays – a jovial and genuine laugh of amusement.

“I don’t know why you ever sent me a messenger, Great King,” he said lightly, addressing his rival, “I made my goals quite clear to you from the start, did I not? What would your messenger have negotiated?”

The Licchavi Chief smiled nervously.

“For that matter, what have you come to talk about?” Ajātaśatru continued. “I could kill you right now, you know, just as I did to the messenger,” —the Licchavis unsheathed their swords and acted offended; Ajātaśatru ignored them and addressed the courtiers— “What would you do about it? I’m the messenger now. Ooh don’t shoot the messenger! But what if the messenger shoots you? I jest, I jest. War between us will not benefit anybody. Besides me.” The Magadhi king bared his teeth.

Trying not to look appalled, the Licchavi Chief folded his hands: “Great King … I have come to surrender to you.”

“Oh? Could you not have just killed yourself? Please do not be offended! I would quite enjoy murdering you myself, Great King, but I am quite the busy man, you know.”

The Magadhi chortled heartily, his courtiers laughing alongside him, while his rival was sweating. He turned to the Licchavi Minister.

“Ah, Chief Minister!” he cried. “How stoic your face is – how manlily you stand! You must be so intelligent, so firm, so righteous! And yet you lose to me – a short Magadhi barbarian who regards himself a genius for having invented one intrigue, while in the Western realms, educated Brāhmaṇas like yourself revel in the study of hundreds of such devices of their own invention! Do you wish to know why, Chief Minister? Do you wish to know my secret – why I win, and you lose?”

The Chief Minister did not answer.

Ajātaśatru continued.

“Everywhere from Vaiśālī to Takṣaśilā, the Brāhmaṇas present themselves as the manly, decisive, realist defenders of Vedic civilization – of great ingenuity and strong morals – with a grand master-plan, to be playing an elaborate and complicated game, so that every loss is truly a step to an eventual victory – that they will never allow the great civilization of their construction to fall to a deranged lunatic like myself.”

–he pointed at his own ridiculous wolf-skin outfit–

“Beware the wolf in sheep’s skin, they say! But I say: beware the sheep in wolf’s skin! Beware a man who possesses no goals but takes false glory from the appearance of a cunning, ambitious genius! That is all that most men are: sheep! and it is cheap to pretend – and pretending to be a wolf gives you all the benefits you desire: the vulvas of well-endowed women, social respect, some royal titles and grants – mainly the vulvas of well-endowed women – but the achievement of no real goals in life. And that is the reason why I win and you lose–”

The Magadhi king’s expression turned sombre, and he made an exaggerated gesture of clutching his temple with his forefingers and sniffling.

“–because you truly do not even care about defeating me! You care about appearing to care about defeating me – because that speaks well of your sense of judgement of what ought to be, whether that signal is true or false.”

Ajātaśatru sniffled some more, then punched his own minister in the face to address him.

“Do you want to know what I care about, Varṣākāra? Showing what, for once, a wolf – not even in sheep’s clothing – in wolf’s clothing–” he drew attention to his own attire “–can accomplish in a world of sheep. And that lesson, however expensive or destructive it may be, will be greatly beneficial to the world!”

“Will it?” asked a courtier. Varṣākāra sighed internally as the king of Magadha sliced the annoyance in two.

“Will it?” Ajātaśatru mimicked. “I DON’T KN— I DON’T CARE if it is beneficial! That was a lie! I spoke, in very clear terms, about what I cared about: showing what one wolf can accomplish in a world of sheep. If that is all I care about, obviously I’m lying when I say that is motivated by an even deeper desire to benefit the world. Oh, but Ajātaśatru, why did you lie? Why did you put on a pretense, why did you flash some sheep skin for a moment? Because I knew some idiot would say WILL IT REALLY? and I could then make an example out of him, and go on this whole rant; there are so many levels to my thinking, too deep for all your small intellects to comprehend, thus furthering my goal of demonstrating what a wolf can do in a world of sheep—” he gestured to those seated around him, “—Oh, and maybe I should just behead all of you, because you just believed the explanation I gave you for what I said and did, believed that I truly anticipated and predicted the reaction in advance and plotted it all, much like the foolish Licchavi Chief who believed this about his Minister, and now you do not know what to believe, thus furthering my goal of demonstrating what a wolf can do in a world of sheep.”

The king guffawed amusedly.

And then his expression turned serious.

“You know,” he said, “I’m very sad. Very lonely. When I ascended the throne of Magadha, I fantasized about fighting great wars, playing games of intrigue against intellects equal to my own in cunning and strategic acumen – to outsmart such minds and dominate them – to earn my victory, rather than simply have it be handed to me. But if my opponent’s goal is not to win at all, then what even is the game?”

Ajātaśatru beheaded the Licchavi Chief, whose allies rose in protest but quickly found themselves restrained by the Magadhas.

Forcing a smile, he asked no-one in particular: “But did I plan for that?”